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A widely shared September 2026 essay by Warsaw-based writer Tom Wojcik traces how the closure of the Strait of Hormuz since March has cascaded into record oil prices, fuel shortages in France, surging freight costs, and looming food-supply risks into 2027. The piece argues that decades of trading stockpiles and buffers for cheap dependencies left the system without slack when several shocks hit at once.
Warsaw-based writer Tom Wojcik published a data-grounded essay on 21 September 2026 arguing that the world’s 2026 crises — fuel shortages, shrinking harvests and threatened winter heating — are not separate events but one chain reaction flowing from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Writing from a country that borders the war in Ukraine and heats itself with coal and imported gas, Wojcik compiles figures, as of 26 September, showing how the closure of a single maritime chokepoint has propagated into fuel pumps in France, potato fields in Belgium and bond markets far beyond.
According to the essay, US and Israeli military operations against Iran began in late February 2026, and since March Iran has kept the Strait of Hormuz closed using drones, missiles, mines and small boats. Wojcik reports that tanker traffic through the strait has fallen by more than 90 percent, and cites the International Energy Agency calling it the largest supply disruption the oil market has ever seen. A fragile ceasefire briefly pulled prices back to pre-war levels in early summer before collapsing; by late September, Brent crude touched $108 a barrel on 24 September, after trading near $97 in early September.
The closure has produced outsized winners in shipping. Wojcik reports that the Breakwave Tanker Shipping ETF, which tracks the cost of hiring crude tankers, rose more than 600 percent in the first two months of the war and was up more than 2,300 percent for the year by early September. Day rates for some supertankers rose from under $100,000 before the war to a record of about $860,000 on 10 September. He notes the fund is small and that its own manager expects rates to fall if the strait reopens.
Parallel pressures include Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian refineries — at least 70 hits this year, roughly once every four days by the IEA’s count — pushing Russian refining output to a two-decade low. US diesel passed $6 a gallon for the first time on 10 September, and Wojcik reports the American president has phoned Kyiv asking it to stop hitting diesel targets. In France, official data showed 15 percent of fuel stations dry on 20 September, concentrated among capped-price TotalEnergies outlets, which the government says reflects distribution strain rather than a genuine shortage.
Why One Closed Strait Reaches Polish Kitchens
Wojcik’s central argument is that thirty years of swapping buffers for dependencies left the global system without slack: “a supplier is cheaper than a stockpile and a guarantee is cheaper than an army,” he writes, and when one dependency failed it was replaced with another rather than rebuilt with reserves. What makes 2026 different, in his framing, is that several of those dependencies were tested simultaneously.
The food dimension carries the longest tail. The strait normally carries up to 30 percent of internationally traded fertiliser, and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization warns scarcity will cut yields and tighten food supplies through late 2026 and into 2027. Because fertiliser that arrives late cannot recover lost yield, the damage stays hidden until smaller harvests arrive. The World Food Programme estimates sustained high oil prices could push up to 45 million more people into acute food insecurity, on top of a baseline in which 2025 recorded the first two confirmed famines — in Gaza and Sudan — in the history of the Global Report on Food Crises.
From Potato Glut to a 25 Percent Shortfall
Wojcik grounds the global argument in local detail. Europe’s potato belt illustrates the volatility in a single season: after a 2025 glut in which Polish growers alone lifted about 7 million tonnes, 18 percent more than the year before, growers in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Germany planted 14 percent less. Five heatwaves and a drought followed, and their growers’ organisation now expects a harvest down 25 percent — among the smallest in a decade — with Belgian processing potato prices jumping from €10 to €150 a tonne within days.
Diplomatically, the situation remains fluid. Wojcik reports that on 22 September Iran handed Washington a written road map proposing a regional ceasefire of up to 60 days, a phased reopening of the strait and an end to the American naval blockade. Washington rejected it, and by one report the president expects to resume bombing after the November midterm elections. The Red Sea route that would normally detour around the Gulf is itself compromised: Houthi forces seized a key Yemeni port this month at the Bab al-Mandab chokepoint.
“For thirty years we swapped buffers for dependencies, because a supplier is cheaper than a stockpile and a guarantee is cheaper than an army. When a dependency failed, we did not rebuild the buffer. We found another dependency.”
— Tom Wojcik, author of the report
Where the Numbers Stop Being Settled
Several elements of the picture rest on single attributions or partial data. The claim that the US president expects to resume bombing after the midterms is reported by Wojcik as coming from one report, without further sourcing. The French station-outage figures come from official counts that Wojcik himself notes understate gaps, since a station is listed only when it is out of every petrol grade or out of diesel.
The food outlook depends on forecasts, not observed outcomes: FAO warnings about yields through 2027 describe expected effects of fertiliser scarcity, and the WFP’s 45 million figure is an estimate conditional on sustained high oil prices. The essay’s cut-off is 26 September 2026, and the diplomatic situation — including Iran’s rejected road map and the Houthi port seizure — remains actively developing.
Watch the Ceasefire, the Harvest and Winter
Wojcik’s essay points to three things to watch: whether any ceasefire and phased reopening of the Strait of Hormuz emerges after the November US midterm elections; whether the FAO’s delayed harvest damage materialises in late 2026 and 2027 food supplies; and how European countries dependent on imported gas and coal — including Poland — manage winter heating with a half-empty gas cavern in Bavaria already noted in the report. Shipping markets, he cautions via the ETF manager’s own comment, would fall sharply if the strait reopens, making the 2,300 percent gain a bet on the closure persisting rather than a permanent shift.
Key Questions
Who is Tom Wojcik and why is his report getting attention?
Tom Wojcik is a Warsaw-based writer who published the essay on 21 September 2026 on his personal site. It combines official statistics from the IEA, UN agencies and national governments with a first-person Polish perspective connecting the Gulf war to everyday European costs.
Is France actually running out of fuel?
According to official data cited in the report, no. On 20 September, 15 percent of French stations had run out of petrol or diesel, concentrated among TotalEnergies outlets that cap prices at €1.99 a litre. The government rules out a shortage; the dry pumps reflect demand surging toward capped stations faster than they could be refilled.
Why would food get worse in 2027 even if the strait reopens?
The Strait of Hormuz normally carries up to 30 percent of internationally traded fertiliser. The FAO warns that late-arriving fertiliser cannot recover yield already lost, so the smaller harvests will only become visible in late 2026 and into 2027, regardless of what happens to oil prices now.
How much have oil and shipping costs risen?
Per the report, Brent crude touched $108 a barrel on 24 September, and supertanker day rates hit a record of about $860,000 on 10 September, up from under $100,000 before the war. The Breakwave Tanker Shipping ETF was up more than 2,300 percent for the year by early September.
What is Poland’s specific exposure in this report?
Wojcik writes that Poland borders Europe’s largest war since 1945, heats itself with coal and imported gas, and is arming itself on borrowed money. He highlights Polish potato harvest swings, grain prices and winter heating as places where the global cascade lands locally.
Source: hn
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